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ITALY AND THE WAR.
BY THE EDITOR.
IT is difficult to understand why Italy entered the war. The
Italians
are not a warlike people, and it is not likely that they will reap
laurels on the battlefield. Italy is the youngest nation of Europe,
the union of all the states of the peninsula occurring in 1870. The
founder of United Italy was Victor Emmanuel, a Piedmontese prince,
and he was supported by the republican Garibaldi who in the name
of republican Italians was a fitting hero to champion the ideal of
a united Italy.
Even to-day Austria is regarded as the arch-enemy of Italy,
though in the past Austria has given up portion after portion of her
Italian possessions, not because of any Italian conquest but because
other conditions forced Austria to yield. First, Austria gave up
large sections of northern Italy to Napoleon III, who won the battle
of Magenta, and Napoleon III ceded this stretch of western Lom-
bardy to Italy, but retained for France the most beautiful stretch
of the Riviera at Nice. The surrender of Nice was greatly resented
by the Italians, but they comforted themselves by the gain of western
Lombardy. Eastern Lombardy was surrendered by Austria in
spite of Austrian victories over the Italian army, on account of
Prussia. Italy had been the ally of Prussia, and Prussian victories
forced Austria to make peace, Prussia insisting on rewarding her
ally by the eastern portion of Lombardy in 1866.
But Bismarck did not mean to cripple Austria and cut her off
entirely from the sea, so this surrender of Italian country did not
include Triest ; and we must remember that Triest was the only
harbor in possession of Austria. We can understand how, in the
present war, Austria was not willing to give it up to Italy. Italy
is not in need of more ports, for the sea touches it on three sides
and it is richly endowed with most valuable harbors. A fair con-
sideration ought to allow Austria to keep this port.
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In 1883 Italy joined the Triple Alliance and has derived great
benefits by being in close touch with Austria and Prussian Germany.
In fact it was through Prussia that Italy was able to accomplish
its designs of complete unification, for France prevented Rome
from falling into the hands of the kingdom. Napoleon favored the
Roman Catholic church and protected the pope in his political am-
bitions as a worldly sovereign and head of the Eternal City. French
troops garrisoned Rome, and so King Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi
were prevented from taking the jewel of Italy, the natural capital
of the country, by storm. It was during the war of 1870-71 be-
tween Prussia and France that the French garrison was withdrawn
and that Garibaldi boldly entered Rome and deposed the pope as a
temporal sovereign. The Italian government however has been
careful to respect the pope as a spiritual authority and has allowed
him unreserved and even sovereign rights in the Vatican. At any
rate the possession of Rome is due to Prussia's support of Italy,
and after the establishment of the alliance between Prussian Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary the Italians found it quite advisable to
join the two central powers and so establish the Triple Alliance.
Italy's ambition has been to become again the power of the
Mediterranean Sea. The main obstacle to this plan was first of all
England, for England has the Mediterranean locked up at both ends,
at Gibraltar and Suez, and in addition holds Malta, a strategic
central positon. France is more powerful than Italy, and so France
with the connivance of England has increased her navy and has
begun to play a prominent part in the Mediterranean as a kind of
protectorate state of Great Britain. When the Triple Entente was
formed the Mediterranean was, as it were, promised to France by
Great Britain, and this promise involved the condition that Italy's
ambition should not be considered. Nevertheless Great Britain was
ambitious to isolate Germany and break up the Triple Alliance.
Thus the British diplomats, first of all by favoring Italy and not
opposing the Italian intention to gain Tripoli, imitated the policy
followed by France to gain Algiers and Morocco. Germany was
naturally inclined to let Italy gain a foothold in Africa, for Italy
belonged to the Triple Alliance, so she exercised sufficient pressure
on Turkey to cause the latter to surrender this portion of African
territory. It was through peace with Turkey that Italy gained
Tripoli. Otherwise she would have found it very difificult to gain
a foothold in that country. At any rate the fight was much harder
than the Italian military leaders had expected.
Of late the Italians have broken away from the Triple Alliance.
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They owe their very existence to the support of Prussian Germany,
nevertheless they found what they beheved were sufficient reasons
for not declaring war on France while still living up to their agree-
ment with the Triple Alliance. I will even go further and say that
the terms of the Triple Alliance were not such as to oblige Italy
to go to war. Italy regarded the war on Germany's part as offensive
and not as a mere defense against her enemies. But not content
with remaining neutral, Italy finally joined the enemies of Ger-
many and declared war on Austria-Hungary. In an endeavor to
keep Italy peaceful, Austria-Hungary, at the suggestion of Ger-
many, offered to surrender those portions of Austrian territory in
which the Italian language is still spoken, with the single exception
of Triest, Austria's only harbor, which she therefore could not give
up without surrendering her entire navy and all her maritime inter-
ests. She offered, however, to make Triest a free city and endow
it with an Italian university, which would have been a great ad-
vantage for Italian interests in the city. But all these offers were
refused and Italy preferred the doubtful issue of a war.
It is difficult to understand why Italy joined the cause of the
Allies. In the first place, France and England are her most power-
ful rivals in the Mediterranean. If the Allies prevail in this war
Italy's influence in the Mediterranean will be practically reduced to
that of a vassal of England. Moreover, if this state of things should
come about, France would still be her direct rival, for France is
not likely to tolerate an Italian navy as strong as her own in the
Mediterranean, and it is still more unlikely that France will agree
to divide her influence in the Mediterranean with any other power.
Italy can accomplish her ambitions only with the assistance of
Germany and Austria, the central powers of Europe. As matters
stand now, she has broken with the friends who would naturally
stand by her and has joined those who are her natural enemies.
How was it possible that Italy should have entered into this
war, not only needlessly but also against her own interests, by
joining her natural enemies and opposing her natural friends? It
almost looks as if some sinister personal interest were at play. The
end which the Italians are made to serve in this war is exclusively
in the interest of the Allies without any possible result for Italy
except perhaps the acquisition of Triest in the event of a victory
of the Allies over Germany and Austria.
This is Italy's fifth war against Austria-Hungary, and there is
scarcely any battle or combat in the four previous wars, in sixty-
seven years, in which the Italians have gained any advantage. The
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Italians fought against Austria in 1848 and, after a truce, in 1849 ;
further conflicts occurred in 1859 and 1866; and now, in 1915, the
countries are at war for the fifth time.
Field Marshall Radetzky is still mentioned in the book of fame
for his great victory at Custozza on July 25, 1849, where, after a
hard fight of ten hours, the Sardinian army was utterly routed, as
afterwards also at Villafranca. On the 21st of March, 1849, the
Austrians beat the Italians at Mortara, and on March 23 Radetzky
beat the Italians again at Novara, King Charles Albert of Sardinia
abdicating his throne in consequence of the defeat. In 1866 another
battle at Custozza was fought on June 24 under the Archduke Al-
brecht of Austria, where 75,000 Austrians beat 130,000 Italians
under King Victor Emmanuel. In the same year, 1866, on July 20,
the Austrian navy under Admiral Tegetthoff gained a complete vic-
tory over the Italian fleet under Persano, In spite of these decisive
victories Austria ceded northern Italy to Italy in the peace made
with Prussia at Vienna.
The Italians are not warlike, but that is no fault. Peaceful
people too have a right to existence. But it seems to us that nations
that lack the necessary manhood for waging war should be distin-
guished by a love of peace. But among all the nations no one has
cared more for war than Italy. The sons of Italy have even shown
themselves incompetent to meet savages in battle, and when the
Italians sent a goodly number of their army to East African shores
it was a sorry day for them, for the whole army was cut off by the
Abyssinians, and not one of the poor Italians who were ambushed
in the Abyssinian mountains returned to tell the tale. At that time
Italy did not dare to send a punitive expedition but allowed the
Abyssinians to continue their independence from the Italian crown.
It is a dangerous game that the Italians are playing, and we
must wait to see what will come of it. It is a war that certainly
cannot serve Italian interests, for if Great Britain and the Allies win,
Italy will be reduced to a state of British vassalage ; and if they
lose, Italy has oflfended her best friends by having ranged herself
with their enemies. Why the government of Italy has taken this
course is almost incomprehensible. At any rate we must confess
that British diplomacy has here shown its great genius for inducing
nations to go to war against their own interests.
